On Resource Allocation for Network Slicing with Stackelberg Game

Abstract

With the widely used of 5G, network slice is becoming a hot issue for providing mobile uses with diversity services. In this paper, we propose an interaction model among multiple network service providers (SPs) and multiple users by adopting the multiple leader multiple follower (MLMF) Stackelberg game for the slices of wireless networks. In this model, the SPs serve as the Stackelberg leaders, which can lease the base station resources (e.g., spectrum, transmission power and antennas) to users to make revenue. Furthermore, these SPs compete with each other to maximize their revenue via pricing resources. Correspondingly, the users are the Stackelberg followers with a fixed budget, which can select the spectrum of SPs within their budge to maximize their utility. Moreover, we solve the problem of selecting the optimal spectrum for users, and then adopt an iterative algorithm to calculate the optimal spectrum pricing of SPs. Numerical results show that the MLMF Stackelberg game can converge to a unique Stackelberg equilibrium under this algorithm.