Stackelberg Game-Based Network Slicing for Joint Wireless Access and Backhaul Resource Allocation

Abstract

Network slicing is an emerging technology that enables network operators to efficiently monetize their infrastructure investment while meeting the ever-increasing network traffic demand. In this paper, we study a network slicing scenario where wireless access and wireless backhaul infrastructures are owned and managed by a wireless access service provider (WASP) and backhaul service providers (BHSPs), respectively. These service providers (SPs) are interested in providing an end-to-end network service to user equipments (UEs) while making profits through network resource trading. To study the market-based interactions among the WASP, BHSPs and UEs, we propose a Stackelberg game framework for access and backhaul resource pricing and allocation. The Stackelberg game equilibrium is determined by transforming the underlying bilevel programming (BLP) problem into a single-level program (SLP). Then, we apply the big-M and multi-parametric disaggregated techniques (MDT) to respectively address the non-convexity caused by the complementary slackness constraints and bilinear product terms. Numerical results are presented to confirm the efficacy of our proposed framework in terms of market stability and profitability for all the players.