¿Moral del deber o moral de la virtud?

Abstract

This paper is a discussion of the problem of translating theoretically well founded normative propositions into behaviourary maxims effectively applicable for moral agents. To this end I consider, in the first place, the solution proposed by the theorists of moral duty in its two forms: systematic morality and critical morality. First, the Kantian theory of intelligible will is examined and shown to be unsatisfactory. Secondly, I consider Hare's proposal which presents itself as a variant on the problem of the weakness of the will; this solution turns out to be unsatisfactory as well. Then I consider the solution afforded by the morality of virtue from Aristotle to MacIntyre, in particular its application to the distinction between the akratés and the akólastos. It is shown in what manner this solution can open the way to cultural relativism, and from there to morality. I conclude by pointing out that the problem is at present an insoluble one whose terms I have tried to clarify.