Multi-Stage Pricing Game for Collusion-Resistant Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

Abstract

ZhuJiandK.J.RayLiu,Fellow, IEEE Abstract—In order to fully utilize scarce spectrum resources, dynamic spectrum allocation becomes a promising approach to increase the spectrum efficiency for wireless networks. However, the collusion among selfish network users may seriously deteriorate the efficiency of dynamic spectrum sharing. The network users ’ behaviors and dynamics need to be taken into consideration for efficient and robust spectrum allocation. In this paper, we model the spectrum allocation in wireless networks with multiple selfish legacy spectrum holders and unlicensed users as multi-stage dynamic games. In order to combat user collusion, we propose a pricing-based collusion-resistant dynamic spectrum allocation approach to optimize overall spectrum efficiency, while not only keeping the participating incentives of the selfish users but also combating possible user collusion. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme achieves high efficiency of spectrum usage even with the presence of severe user collusion. Index Terms—Game theory, auction theory, cognitive radio, spectrum management, wireless networks. I.