A scalable collusion-resistant multi-winner cognitive spectrum auction game

Abstract

Dynamic spectrum access (DSA), enabled by cognitive radio technologies, has become a promising approach to improve efficiency in spectrum utilization, and the spectrum auction is one important DSA approach, in which secondary users lease some unused bands from primary users. However, spectrum auctions are different from existing auctions studied by economists, because spectrum resources are interference-limited rather than quantity-limited, and it is possible to award one band to multiple secondary users with negligible mutual interference. To accommodate this special feature in wireless communications, in this paper, we present a novel multi-winner spectrum auction game not existing in auction literature. As secondary users may be selfish in nature and tend to be dishonest in pursuit of higher profits, we develop effective mechanisms to suppress their dishonest/collusive behaviors when secondary users distort their valuations about spectrum resources and interference relationships. Moreover, in order to make the proposed game scalable when the size of problem grows, the semi-definite programming (SDP) relaxation is applied to reduce the complexity significantly. Finally, simulation results are presented to evaluate the proposed auction mechanisms, and demonstrate the complexity reduction as well.