Single-sided truthful auction mechanism for heterogeneous channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Monisha Devi; Nityananda Sarma; Sanjib K. Deka

doi:10.1007/s11276-023-03412-7

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Single-sided truthful auction mechanism for heterogeneous channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

Monisha Devi Nityananda Sarma Sanjib K. Deka

Year: 2023 Journal: Wireless Networks Vol: 29 (8)Pages: 3445-3467 Publisher: Springer Science+Business Media

DOI: 10.1007/s11276-023-03412-7

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Keywords:

Computer science Cognitive radio Bidding Spectrum auction Revenue Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Resource allocation Channel (broadcasting) Auction theory Spectrum management Computer network Payment Revenue equivalence Wireless Microeconomics Telecommunications Business

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Cognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing

Physical Sciences → Computer Science → Computer Networks and Communications

Auction Theory and Applications

Social Sciences → Decision Sciences → Management Science and Operations Research

Power Line Communications and Noise

Physical Sciences → Engineering → Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Single-sided truthful auction mechanism for heterogeneous channel allocation in cognitive radio networks

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Citation History

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