The Historical Challenge to Future-Proof Science

Abstract

Abstract This chapter engages with the literature on contemporary scientific scepticism. It is argued that some of the scholars who describe themselves as ‘sceptics’, or ‘antirealists’, actually allow for some (even many) examples of ‘future-proof science’. This sounds backward, but that is only because of a confusing use of labels and problematic terminology. Whilst the realism debate concerns our epistemic stance vis-à-vis ‘unobservables’, this book has no such focus, and most of the proffered examples of ‘future-proof science’ concern observables (broadly construed). Thus many of the antirealist’s usual arguments—designed as they are to doubt our knowledge of unobservables—are not relevant. Some arguments still are relevant, since they equally affect scientific claims about observables and unobservables. However, since the focus is now on observables, many antirealists will want to defend against these arguments just as much as realists, and the distinction between ‘realists’ and ‘antirealists’ breaks down.