Cyber-Resilient Control of an Islanded Microgrid Under Latency Attacks and Random DoS Attacks

Abstract

The information exchange among distributed energy resources (DERs) in microgrids (MGs) is through sensing and communication systems, which are prone to expose cyber-attack threats. This article investigates the stability issue of MG systems with distributed secondary control under latency attacks and random denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Considering these two kinds of attack modes, the corresponding attack consequences including network jamming and time-varying latency in the communication network are simultaneously studied. First, a new metric is defined to quantify the DoS attacks by considering different network jamming choices. Then, the time-domain stability study is conducted considering both attack consequences. Next, a cyber-resilient control strategy is proposed with two control modes: 1) An adaptive-gain resilient controller to sustain the fast stabilization of MG systems under nonuniform time-varying latency attacks, which is proved by the stochastic stability analysis using Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional method. 2) An event-trigger topology reconfiguration controller against excessive latency and damaged cyber connectivity caused by DoS attacks. A switching mechanism for coordinating the above control modes is also designed to guarantee the secondary control functions of MG systems. A modified IEEE 13-bus MG system with five DERs is tested and the effectiveness of the proposed controller under different attack scenarios is verified by OPAL-RT real-time tests.