Contract-Based Traffic Offloading over Delay Tolerant Networks

Abstract

Traffic offloading over Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) is a promising paradigm to alleviate the network congestion caused by explosive traffic demands. As we all know, in mobile networks, the delay profile for traffic is remarkable due to user's mobility. How to exploit delay tolerance to improve the profit of the operator as well as mobile users becomes a big challenge. In this paper, we investigate the problem of the interrelation of delay and user QoS. Inspired by contract theory, we model the delayed offloading process as a monopoly market where the operator makes pricing by considering statistical information about user satisfaction. In addition, we propose an incentive framework to motivate users to leverage their delay and price sensitivity in exchange for service cost. To capture the heterogeneity of user satisfaction, we classify users into different types. Each user chooses an appropriate quality-price contract item according to its type. Moreover, we derive an optimal contract which is feasible and maximizes the operator's profit as well. Numerical results validate the effectiveness of our incentive framework for traffic offloading over DTNs.