BOOK

Four-Dimensionalism

Michael C. Rea

Year: 2005 Oxford University Press eBooks   Publisher: Oxford University Press

Abstract

This article provides a critical overview of the main arguments in favour of four-dimensionalism. It begins by discussing several issues that will help us better understand the nature of the debate between presentists and four-dimensionalists. Then the article discusses in detail the three main arguments in support of four-dimensionalism: the argument from the impossibility of temporal passage, the truthmaker argument, and the argument from special relativity. The first two arguments on their own pose no serious threat to presentism. However, the options available to presentists for replying to the third argument are extremely implausible, and that the considerations commonly cited in favour of presentism are generally outweighed by those arising out of the first and third arguments taken together. Thus, it is concluded that, as the debate currently stands in the literature, four-dimensionalism has the upper hand.

Keywords:
Presentism Argument (complex analysis) Epistemology Impossibility Ontology Philosophy Political science Law

Metrics

3
Cited By
0.00
FWCI (Field Weighted Citation Impact)
0
Refs
0.39
Citation Normalized Percentile
Is in top 1%
Is in top 10%

Citation History

Topics

Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Social Sciences →  Psychology →  Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Social Sciences →  Arts and Humanities →  Philosophy
Philosophy and History of Science
Social Sciences →  Arts and Humanities →  History and Philosophy of Science

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