Security Analysis of Cyber-Physical System under False Data Injection Attacks

Abstract

In this paper, the security analysis of the cyber-physical system which is modeled as linear dynamical system is investigated. The attackers can maliciously inject some false data into measurement and actuation channels; and the false data injection attacks are stealthy (complete stealthy) if the attack actions can bypass a χ ² detector (completely remove its impacts on monitored normal innovation). Correspondingly, a cyber-physical system is insecure if it can be destabilized by a stealthy or complete stealthy attack. When the attackers are able to compromise all measurement and part of (all) actuation channels, a necessary and sufficient condition for the attack effectiveness is established. In addition, a sufficient condition for the security of the system is derived when part of measurement and all (part of) actuation channels are under attacks. Finally, some simulations are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the obtained results.