Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

Drew Fudenberg; Yuichi Yamamoto

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.003

ScienceGate Book Chapters

JOURNAL ARTICLE

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

Drew Fudenberg Yuichi Yamamoto

Year: 2011 Journal: Journal of Economic Theory Vol: 146 (5)Pages: 1733-1769 Publisher: Elsevier BV

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.003

Get Full-Text PDF Get Analytical Report

Keywords:

Stochastic game Imperfect Characterization (materials science) Repeated game Mathematical economics State (computer science) Mathematics Information structure Folk theorem Private information retrieval Computer science Game theory Equilibrium selection Algorithm Statistics

Metrics

Cited By

5.49

FWCI (Field Weighted Citation Impact)

Refs

0.96

Citation Normalized Percentile

Is in top 1%

Is in top 10%

Citation History

Topics

Game Theory and Applications

Social Sciences → Decision Sciences → Management Science and Operations Research

Auction Theory and Applications

Social Sciences → Decision Sciences → Management Science and Operations Research

Merger and Competition Analysis

Social Sciences → Economics, Econometrics and Finance → Economics and Econometrics

Learning from private information in noisy repeated games

Metrics

Citation History

Topics

Related Documents

Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games

Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games