A Finite-Time Stealthy Covert Attack Against Cyber-Physical Systems

Abstract

In the last decade, several cyber-attacks against Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) have been investigated, and different active and passive control solutions have been proposed to assure the absence of undetectable attacks. In this paper, first, we show that most of the studied attacks, if performed for a finite-time duration, can be straightforwardly detected in the post-attack phase. Then, given a proper justification for the existence of finite-time attacks, we show that a finite-time stealthy covert attack can be performed if the attacker takes ad-hoc actions before terminating. We propose a practical implementation of a finite-time covert attack, obtained by combining a finite impulse response receding-horizon filter and reachability arguments. Finally, a simulation example, involving a quadruple-tanks water system, is shown to better clarify the capabilities of the designed attack.