False Data Injection Attacks against State Estimation in AC-DC Hybrid Power System

Abstract

The extensive application of information and communication technology enhances the observability and controllability of modem power systems. However, it increases their vulnerabilities to malicious cyber-attacks. False data injection attacks (FDIAs) are a class of common cyber-attacks, which compromise the grid meters and mislead the state estimation process. Attacks in AC system are widely researched, if an FDIA satisfies certain conditions, the attacker can manipulate these modified measurements to bypass the commonly used residue-based bad data detection (BDD) algorithms, and introduce arbitrary errors into the state estimator. However, with the increasing proportion of High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) in power system, these studies are not applicable to AC-DC hybrid system. In this paper, we propose the possibility of constructing an FDIA in an AC-DC hybrid power system. Firstly, this paper analyzes the basic principle of a successful FDIA in an AC system. Secondly, the paper proposes an attack strategy in an AC-DC hybrid power system and constructs the attack model. Finally, we demonstrate the attack model on a modified IEEE 30-bus system.