Optimal Pricing-Based Edge Computing Resource Management in Mobile Blockchain

Abstract

As the core issue of blockchain, the mining requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power needed. Thus, the development of blockchain in mobile applications is restricted. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider the edge computing as the network enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study optimal pricing-based edge computing resource management to support mobile blockchain applications where the mining process can be offloaded to an Edge computing Service Provider (ESP). We adopt a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the ESP and the individual utilities of different miners. In Stage~I, the ESP sets the price of edge computing services. In Stage~II, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. Further, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg game are validated for both pricing schemes. At last, the performance evaluation shows that the ESP intends to set the maximum possible value as optimal price for profit maximization under uniform pricing. In addition, the discriminatory pricing helps the ESP to encourage higher total service demand from miners and achieve greater profit correspondingly.