Verifiable memory leakage-resilient dynamic searchable encryption

Abstract

Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) allows a data owner to outsource his encrypted data to a cloud server while retaining the ability to perform keyword search over encrypted data. The security guarantees of existing SSE schemes require that the adversary has no access to the data owner's secret keys. Unfortunately, adversaries may get some or all of the secret keys through memory attacks. Facing such memory attacks, most existing SSE schemes are no longer secure. Recently, a memory leakage-resilient dynamic SSE (MLR-DSSE) scheme has been proposed to resist memory attacks from physically unclonable functions (PUFs). However, this scheme does not consider the possibility of dishonest behaviors on the part of cloud servers. In this paper, we first propose a verifiable MLR-DSSE scheme based on PUFs and a verifiable hash table. The construction not only resists memory attacks but also supports verifiable search and dynamic updates. Besides, due to the combination of the secret sharing technique with PUFs, our proposed scheme can recover secret keys even if some PUFs are broken. Furthermore, the security analysis demonstrates that our proposed scheme is non-adaptively secure against memory attacks. The evaluation experiment results show that our scheme is efficient.