Secure Wireless Powered and Cooperative Jamming D2D Communications

Abstract

This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered device-to-device (D2D)\ncommunication network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, where a hybrid\nbase station (BS) in a cellular network not only provides power wirelessly for\nthe D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D network, but also\nserves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere with the eavesdroppers. The\ncellular and D2D networks can belong to different service providers, which\nmeans that the D2D transmitter would need to pay for the energy service\nreleased by the hybrid BS to guarantee secure D2D communication. In order to\nexploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter, we\nfirst formulate a Stackelberg game based energy trading scheme, where the\nquadratic energy cost model is considered. Then, a non-energy trading based\nStackelberg game is investigated to study the reversed roles of the BS and the\nD2D users. For comparison, we also formulate and resolve the social welfare\noptimization problem. We derive the closed-form Stackelberg equilibriums of the\nformulated games and the optimal solutions for the social welfare optimization\nproblem. Simulation results are provided to validate our proposed schemes to\nhighlight the importance of energy trading interaction between cellular and D2D\nnetworks.\n