BOOK-CHAPTER

On Truthful Auction Mechanisms for Electricity Allocation

Heng SongJunwu ZhuBin LiYi Jiang

Year: 2016 Frontiers in artificial intelligence and applications Pages: 1646-1647

Abstract

As technology evolves and electricity demand rises, more and more research focus on the efficient electricity allocation mechanisms so as to make consumer demand adaptive to the supply of electricity at all times. In this paper, we formulate the problem of electricity allocation as a novel combinatorial auction model, and then put forward a directly applicable mechanisms. It is proven that the proposed mechanism is equipped with some useful economic properties and computational traceability. Our works offer potential avenues for the stduy about efficient electricity allocation methods in smart grid.

Keywords:
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Microeconomics Computer science Business Economics Auction theory Common value auction

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Topics

Smart Grid Energy Management
Physical Sciences →  Engineering →  Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Electric Power System Optimization
Physical Sciences →  Engineering →  Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Auction Theory and Applications
Social Sciences →  Decision Sciences →  Management Science and Operations Research

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