Conclusion: Becoming Individual

Abstract

We cannot deny that the Deleuze presented here as a philosopher of ontogenesis — of the individuation of beings and of their objective illusion of their representational capture — is a somewhat tamed figure. Whilst the almost exclusively theoretical approach we have opted for, both in the delineation of our theme and in the 'archaeological' connections it has allowed us to make between the various philosophers under scrutiny, has not prevented us from broaching the question of the effect of the anomalies of individuation upon the image of philosophy (from Kant to Simondon), we have not expressly considered what we have elsewhere referred to as 'the experience of construction': the consequences, at once ethical and methodological, of the primacy of a preindividual and non-representational field of production, such as affirmed by the authors considered in Part II.1 I would now like to conclude by briefly considering the link between the ontology of anomalous individuation and this thorny question of the 'experience' of philosophy; to ask, as it were, who acts in the theatre of production? Or: what is the 'place' of thinking in the 'universal ungrounding' [effondement] heralded by Deleuze?2