The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Abstract

Abstract The ICTY recognized a right to self-representation for defendants who appeared before it. The basis for this position, however, was specific and even narrower than that of the US Supreme Court. The proceedings involved accusations of utmost gravity (war crimes and crimes against humanity), and political circumstances made the Tribunal vulnerable to the charge of dispensing ‘victor’s justice’. When former political leaders refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the ICTY, self-representation assumed particular importance. To distance itself from the image of a ‘Star Chamber’ and to avoid any insinuation that it was muzzling defendants, the Tribunal found itself compelled to permit self-representation. These considerations were so profound that the Tribunal went further than the US Supreme Court, granting a right to self-representation not only at trial, but also at appellate level, and mandating an unequivocal warning before standby counsel could be appointed or legal representation imposed.