A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources

Ming Zhang; Zizhan Zheng; Ness B. Shroff

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_6

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A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources

Ming Zhang Zizhan Zheng Ness B. Shroff

Year: 2015 Lecture notes in computer science Pages: 93-112 Publisher: Springer Science+Business Media

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-25594-1_6

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Keywords:

Computer science Commit Computer security Game theory Nash equilibrium Focus (optics) Best response Resource (disambiguation) Node (physics) Sequential game Computer network Mathematical economics

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Topics

Information and Cyber Security

Physical Sciences → Computer Science → Information Systems

Network Security and Intrusion Detection

Physical Sciences → Computer Science → Computer Networks and Communications

Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies

Social Sciences → Social Sciences → Political Science and International Relations

A Game Theoretic Model for Defending Against Stealthy Attacks with Limited Resources

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Citation History

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