Secrecy games in cognitive radio networks with multiple secondary users

Abstract

In this paper we investigate secrecy games in cognitive radio networks with multiple secondary pairs and secrecy constraints. We consider the cognitive channel model with multiple secondary pairs where the secondary receivers are treated as eavesdroppers with respect to the primary transmission. For this novel network model, we derive achievable rate regions when secondary pairs are allowed to use the channel simultaneously. We then investigate the spectrum sharing mechanisms using several game theoretic models, namely 1) a single-leader multiple-follower Stackelberg game with the primary transmitter as the leader and the secondary transmitters as followers; 2) a non-cooperative power control game between the secondary transmitters if they can access the channel simultaneously; and 3) an auction between a primary auctioneer and secondary bidders which allows the primary transmitter to exploit the competitive interaction between the secondary transmitters. We illustrate through numerical simulations the equilibrium outcomes of the analyzed games and the impact of the competition between the secondary transmitters on the utility performance of every node in the cognitive radio network.