Jianwei HuangZhu HanMung ChiangH. Vincent Poor
Resource allocation is considered for cooperative transmissions in\nmultiple-relay wireless networks. Two auction mechanisms, SNR auctions and\npower auctions, are proposed to distributively coordinate the allocation of\npower among multiple relays. In the SNR auction, a user chooses the relay with\nthe lowest weighted price. In the power auction, a user may choose to use\nmultiple relays simultaneously, depending on the network topology and the\nrelays' prices. Sufficient conditions for the existence (in both auctions) and\nuniqueness (in the SNR auction) of the Nash equilibrium are given. The fairness\nof the SNR auction and efficiency of the power auction are further discussed.\nIt is also proven that users can achieve the unique Nash equilibrium\ndistributively via best response updates in a completely asynchronous manner.\n
Mohammed W. BaidasAllen B. MacKenzie
Danhua ZhangYouzheng WangJianhua Lü
Xinglong WangLiusheng HuangHongli XuHe Huang
Mohammed W. BaidasAllen B. MacKenzie
Salvatore D’OroLaura GalluccioPanayotis MertikopoulosGiacomo MorabitoSergio Palazzo