Michael LavineMark J. Schervish
Abstract Bayes factors have been offered by Bayesians as alternatives to P values (or significance probabilities) for testing hypotheses and for quantifying the degree to which observed data support or conflict with a hypothesis. In an earlier article, Schervish showed how the interpretation of P values as measures of support suffers a certain logical flaw. In this article, we show how Bayes factors suffer that same flaw. We investigate the source of that problem and consider what are the appropriate interpretations of Bayes factors.
Michael LavineMark J. Schervish
Franz HeftiTimothy L. DentonBeat KnüselPaul A. Lapchak
Janet Saltzman ChafetzRoger W. Libby
Elton José da SilvaClarisse Sieckenius de SouzaRaquel Oliveira PratesAna Maria Nicolaci-da-Costa