Coalitional Game Theoretic Approach for Secondary Spectrum Access in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks

Abstract

In this paper, we exploit a novel setting for Cognitive Radio (CR) networks to enable multiple operators to involve secondary users (SUs) as cooperative relays for their primary users. In return, SUs get an opportunity to access spare channels for their own data transmission. Initially, we assume that the CR network supports payment transfer. Then, we formulate the system as a transferable utility coalitional game. We show that there is an operating point that maximizes the sum utility over all operators and SUs while providing each player a share such that no subset of operators and SUs has an incentive to break away from the grand coalition. Such operating points exist when the solution set of the game, the core, is nonempty. Subsequently, we examine an interesting scenario where there is no payment mechanism in the network. This scenario can be investigated by using a nontransferable utility coalitional game model. We show that there exists a joint action to make the core nonempty. A general method with exponential computational complexity to get such a joint action is discussed. Then, we relate the core of this game to a competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy setting under special situations. As a result, several available efficient centralized or distributed algorithms in economics can be employed to compute a member in the core. In a nutshell, this paper constitutes the design of new coalition based dynamics that could be used in future CR networks.