A combinatorial double auction mechanism for cloud resource group-buying

Abstract

With the development of cloud computing, there is an increasing number of market-based mechanisms for cloud resource allocation. Inspired by the emerging group-buying Web sites, we advocate that group-buying can be applied to cloud resource allocation, and thus cloud providers can benefit from demand aggregation due to the advantage of group-buying in attracting customers, while cloud users can enjoy lower price. However, none of the existing allocation mechanisms is specifically designed for the scenario with group-buying, and it is a challenge for mechanism design to take full advantage of group-buying to maximize the total utility. In this paper, we fill this gap by proposing an innovative auction mechanism. The mechanism is designed based on a combinatorial double auction, in which the allocation algorithm and payment scheme are specifically designed to efficiently generate allocation and compute prices considering group-buying. We theoretically prove that the necessary economic properties in auction design, such as individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness, are satisfied in our work. The experiments show that the proposed mechanism yields higher total utility, and has good scalability.