Power control Stackelberg game in cooperative anti-jamming communications

Abstract

As wireless networks are vulnerable to malicious attacks, security issues have aroused enormous research interest. In this paper, we focus on the anti-jamming power control of transmitters in a cooperative wireless network attacked by a smart jammer with the capability to sense the ongoing transmission power before making a jamming decision. By modeling the interaction between transmitters and a jammer as a Stackelberg game, we analyze the optimal strategies for both transmitters and the jammer and thus derive the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. In addition, the Nash equilibrium of the anti-jamming game is also derived to compare with the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy. Finally, the impacts of the fading channel gains of the transmitters and the jammer on their utilities and the SINR are measured, respectively. Simulation results are presented to verify the performance of the proposed Stackelberg equilibrium strategy.