Power control for mission critical wireless sensor networks using repeated coalitional games

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a coalitional game theoretic approach to the power control problem in resourceconstrained wireless sensor networks, where the objective is to enhance power efficiency of individual sensors while providing the QoS requirements. We model this problem as two-sided one-to-one matching game and deploy deferred acceptance procedure that produces a single matching in the core, which is the set of actions a _N of all sensors such that no coalition of sensors has an action that all its members prefer to a _N . Furthermore, we show that, by applying the procedure repeatedly, a certain stable state is achieved where no sensor can anticipate improvements in their power efficiency as far as all of them are subject to their own QoS constraints. We evaluate our proposal by comparing them with cluster-based coalescing and the local optimal solution obtained by maximizing the total system energy efficiency, where the objective function is non-convex.